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Comparative psychology assesses cognitive abilities and capacities of non-human
animals and humans. Based on performance differences and similarities in various
species in cognitive tests, it is inferred how their minds work and reconstructed how
cognition might have evolved. Critically, such species comparisons are only valid and
meaningful if the tasks truly capture individual and inter-specific variation in cognitive
abilities rather than contextual variables that might affect task performance. Unlike in
human test psychology, however, cognitive tasks for non-human primates (and most
other animals) have been rarely evaluated regarding their measurement validity. We
review recent studies that address how non-cognitive factors affect performance in a
set of commonly used cognitive tasks, and if cognitive tests truly measure individual
variation in cognitive abilities. We find that individual differences in emotional and
motivational factors primarily affect performance via attention. Hence, it is crucial to
systematically control for attention during cognitive tasks to obtain valid and reliable
results. Aspects of test design, however, can also have a substantial effect on
cognitive performance. We conclude that non-cognitive factors are a minor source of
measurement error if acknowledged and properly controlled for. It is essential, however,
to validate and eventually re-design several primate cognition tasks in order to ascertain
that they capture the cognitive abilities they were designed to measure. This will provide
a more solid base for future cognitive comparisons within primates but also across a
wider range of non-human animal species.
Keywords: comparative psychology, cognitive testing, test design, task validity, contextual variables, non-
cognitive factors, individual differences, primates
INTRODUCTION
Comparative psychologists design and use cognitive tests to investigate and compare cognitive
performance and capacities of extant non-human animal species and humans (mainly children).
The ultimate goal is to better understand how animal minds are organized and to reconstruct
the evolution of mind, including the human one. To date, a variety of animal species has been
compared in cognitive studies, ranging from mammals (terrestrial and aquatic ones) to birds
(e.g., Lambert et al., 2018), fish (e.g., Bhsary and Brown, 2014), reptiles (e.g., Wilkinson and
Huber, 2012) and invertebrates such as cephalopods (mainly octopuses: Mather and Kuba, 2013;
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Amodio et al., 2019) or insects (mainly bees: Chittka, 2017;
Solvi et al., 2020). The rationale behind selecting certain
species for cognitive studies is typically a low or high degree
of variation in brain size or socio-ecological factors such as
breeding systems, social structures or feeding ecologies, to better
understand the selective pressures driving cognitive abilities. Of
particular interest for comparative psychologists are cognitive
comparisons between larger-brained species (e.g., non-human
primates, elephants, dolphins, and birds from the corvid and
parrot families; Tomasello and Call, 1997; Pepperberg, 2002;
Emery and Clayton, 2004; Plotnik et al., 2006; Byrne et al., 2009;
Maestripieri, 2012; Manger, 2013; Güntürkün, 2014) and smaller-
brained species (e.g., rodents, pigeons: Scarf et al., 2011; Matzel
and Sauce, 2017) in order to examine the cognitive potential of
large brains. More recently, an increasing number of mammalian
carnivore taxa are also being studied to better understand the
cognitive abilities of this large and in many aspects heterogenous
order (e.g., domestic and wild dogs, hyeanas, bears, andmeerkats:
Townsend et al., 2012; Bensky et al., 2013; Holekamp and
Benson-Amram, 2017; Dale et al., 2019; for a review see:
Vonk and Leete, 2017).
Valid species comparisons pose an immense challenge for
comparative psychology, because obviously, applying a physically
identical task is not sufficient to warrant fair species comparisons,
which led some researchers to argue this may render meaningful
species comparisons impossible (e.g., MacPhail, 1987). A central
challenge of contemporary comparative psychology is that both
the nature of cognitive abilities and their potential evolution need
to be inferred and reconstructed from individual performance
scores in human-devised cognitive tests. In comparative
psychology, such cognitive tasks often address cognitive abilities
from broad domains such as physical cognition to deal with the
non-social world and social cognition to deal with the social
world (Tomasello and Call, 1997). However, when dealing with
more cognitively demanding problems, such as completely novel
ones, an individual is required to draw on cognitive resources
that can be applied across a wide range of problems from diverse
domains. In primates, brain size predicts species-difference in
such a global domain-general cognitive ability, which is reflected
in an IQ-like performance score of a species (G) across a set of
diverse tasks and this performance score increases from humans’
evolutionary most distant primate relatives (lowest scores in
strepsirrhines) to their closest primate relatives (highest scores in
haplorrhines and particularly in great apes; Deaner et al., 2006;
Reader et al., 2011). At least in humans, such a domain-general
intellectual ability is unequivocal at the individual level (g) and
increasing evidence in non-human animals suggests considerable
evolutionary continuity of g (as assessed via reasoning ability
and behavioral flexibility), at least within the mammalian lineage
(mainly rodents and dogs: as reviewed in Burkart et al., 2017a)
including some primates (e.g., tamarins: Banerjee et al., 2009;
chimpanzees: Hopkins et al., 2014; orangutans: Damerius et al.,
2019). However, among primates, the current evidence is still
mixed and controversial with a number of studies finding no
support for a g (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2007; Amici et al., 2012).
This could be consistent with Macphail’s null hypothesis that
no major domain-general species differences are expected in
primates other than humans (MacPhail, 1985), but could also
be an artifact of differences in tests and procedures. In order
to empirically assess such potential intra-species differences in
domain-general cognition, the focus of comparative cognition
studies has recently been shifted from using single tasks
toward cognitive test batteries (sets of at least five tasks from
various cognitive “domains”). Gaining a better understanding of
individual differences will help to achieve the ultimate goal of
comparative psychology: meaningful comparisons across a wide
range of species.
Cognitive testing of non-human primates and other animals
poses several issues for comparative psychology, which become
particularly apparent when using test batteries. In this paper,
we will therefore use established cognitive test batteries to
illustrate some of themost prominent issues researchers generally
encounter when testing non-human primates but also other
animals. Two of these issues are that the outcomes of cognitive
studies should be replicable within individuals or single species
and that the cognitive tasks should reliably capture variation in
the cognitive abilities they were designed to measure.
Are the Outcomes of Cognitive Studies
With Non-human Primates Replicable?
It is conceivable that at least some comparative cognition
tasks do not measure the cognitive abilities they were intended
to measure. Besides aspects of the test-design including task
sensitivity (i.e., the level of task difficulty should be appropriate
to detect individual variation in cognitive performance without
producing ceiling or floor effects), several non-cognitive biases
may affect the outcomes of both original studies and their
replications. Human cognitive test batteries are regularly
evaluated regarding psychometric criteria such as their validity
(e.g., construct validity: whether the cognitive tasks actually
do measure the supposed cognitive abilities their human
developers attempted to measure), and reliability (e.g., test-
retest-reliability: whether repeated administration of the same
tasks to the same participants leads to reproducible outcomes).
In comparative psychology with non-human primates and
other animals, however, such evaluations are currently largely
missing. This might be problematic, especially in light of
the recent replication crisis in human psychology highlighting
that many original research findings, even from studies using
established experimental paradigms, cannot be replicated by
fellow researchers (Open Science Collaboration, 2012; Pashler
and Wagenmaekers, 2012; Earp and Trafimow, 2015). One
consequence of this crisis was a lack of confidence in scientific
studies including the used research practices. Comparative
psychology has so far largely been spared by this crisis of
confidence, but it may be even more susceptible than human
psychology owing to its lack of replication studies (e.g., see Farrar
et al., 2020 for specific challenges in this field).
The few primate studies that assessed the re-test reliability
of primate cognition tests include one that used different test
sessions within single cognitive tasks of the Tamarin Test Battery
(TTB) as a proxy for repeated testing and found a relatively low
correlation between performance scores (Banerjee et al., 2009).
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In an adapted version of the original memory task from the
TTB, marmosets were tested with a no-delay session before
and after the six different delay conditions (Schubiger et al.,
2016). Although they performed in both above chance level,
their performance declined from the former to the latter.
This suggested that although the marmosets were still able
to solve this very simple task, they might not have been
fully motivated anymore to make correct choices after having
completed the full memory task with five delay sessions. However,
in another study, Hopkins et al. (2014) re-tested a subset of their
chimpanzee sample with 13 tasks of the Primate Cognition Test
Battery (PCTB, Herrmann et al., 2007) 2 years later and found
that overall, performance remained relatively stable (besides
improvements in four physical and decreased performance in
one social PCTB task). In addition, a recent meta-analysis on
the repeatability of cognitive performance from 25 species of
six animal classes revealed that cognitive performance could
be replicated in both temporal repeatability by comparing
performance on several exposures of the same task and
contextual repeatability by comparing individual performance
on different tasks that measure the same putative cognitive
ability (Cauchoix et al., 2018). Hence, to assess the validity of
cognitive tests it is important to include, if possible, assessments
of repeatability.
In comparative psychology, large samples, particularly of non-
human primates, are often not available (ManyPrimates et al.,
2019a,b), which limits the statistical power of an empirical study
(but see Smith and Little, 2018 for advantages of small sample
sizes). The next best option to validate obtained test results in
such cases are replications in independent samples of the same
species. Some findings were replicated within species and were
also found in evolutionarily closely related species, which also
establishes the external validity of an optimized task (e.g., a
memory task that is often part of test batteries to establish g:
Schubiger et al., 2016, see also Table 1).
In comparative psychology, the construct validity of cognitive
tasks appears particularly important when assessing individual
and species differences in one cognitive ability or domain
(e.g., inhibitory control: MacLean et al., 2014). However, this
is arguably not equally the case when individuals and species
are tested with test batteries, i.e., sets of cognitive tasks that
assess performance in various cognitive abilities that are not
isolated from each other (but may overlap to some degree;
Huber, 2017; Ramus, 2017), provided these tasks do measure
aspects of cognition. Therefore, the central issue in comparative
psychology is to establish internal task validity more generally,
that is whether a task truly measures individual and species
differences in the cognitive abilities it is supposed to measure
rather than variation in factors that are not primarily of cognitive
nature and might bias the outcomes of a study. Such biases
may be especially problematic when the same individuals are
tested with test batteries consisting of several tasks that might
not be controlled for confounding factors. In test batteries that
are used to evaluate general intelligence (g), the main question
is whether individual performance is correlated across tasks, and
such correlations can be the result of confounds rather than a
true positive manifold (i.e., a positive correlation of unbiased
individual cognitive performance scores; Burkart et al., 2017a).
While some confounding factors are overt and obvious and can
be relatively easily dealt with, such as sensory-motor differences,
other factors may not be as straightforward.
Overtly Necessary Preconditions for
Valid Species Comparisons
Evolutionarily distantly related vertebrate taxa such as mammals
and birds whose cognitive performance is often compared
using the same tasks and test-setups, can vary greatly in
sensory-physiological and morphological variables such as
vision, olfaction and dexterity. Such differences are even more
pronounced when comparing cognition of vertebrate taxa to
invertebrate taxa such as cephalopods or bees. Essential for valid
cognitive comparisons is that three basic preconditions are met.
Every tested individual should possess (i) the sensory (e.g., visual
or auditory) abilities to easily perceive the test apparatus and
distinguish the test stimuli, (ii) the motor skills to easily handle
the test apparatus and (iii) sufficient motivation to participate in
and attend to the cognitive task at hand (Schubiger, 2019). The
first two preconditions are related to test fairness (i.e., comparable
conditions for all individuals to understand a cognitive task and
perform well in it) and are arguably best met in conservative
comparisons between evolutionary closely related taxa such as
within primates or birds, whereas motivational and attentional
aspects can probably not be equally well controlled by restricting
comparisons to closely related taxa.
Reducing Sensory-Motor Influences on
Cognitive Performance by Testing
Primate Species
Even when conducting cognitive species comparisons within
the primate order, some differences in sensory-motor skills
remain that might affect individual test performance if not
considered when constructing test apparatuses. For instance,
many strepsirrhines (lemurs and lorises) are nocturnal and
possess limited color vision (particularly along the red-green
spectrum) and dexterity, while they appear to rely more
on olfaction than haplorrhines (monkeys and apes), most
of whom are diurnal and have excellent stereoscopic color
vision. Yet different haplorrhine primate species, and even
different individuals within a single species, also vary to some
degree in perception and dexterity (King, 2016; Heldstab et al.,
2016). Importantly, such differences have to be considered
when planning and conducting cognitive tests. For instance,
nocturnal strepsirrhines such as mouse lemurs were tested under
infrared light to adapt testing conditions to their activity period
(Kittler et al., 2018; Fichtel et al., 2020). In marmosets, most
males are dichromats (red-green color blind) whereas most
females have trichromatic vision owing to a cone receptor
polymorphism (Pessoa et al., 2005; Freitag and Almeida Pessoa,
2012). In order to ensure these individuals were equally able
to perceive the test stimuli, researchers either used yellow and
blue colored test stimuli or refrained from using colored stimuli
altogether by using black and white ones instead (Schmon,
2011; Strasser and Burkart, 2012; Schubiger et al., 2015, 2016,
2019). Furthermore, one central characteristic of the callitrichids
(marmosets and tamarins) is that they have claws rather than
typical primate hands with fingernails, which needs to be
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TABLE 1 | Effect of internal (subject-related) and external (test design-related) non-cognitive factors on an individual’s motivation to participate, attend, and use an














• High openness ↑ ↑ Training Brown capuchins Morton et al., 2013
• High assertiveness ↓ ↓






= = Social PCTB
tasks
↑ bold (males) = Physical and
social PCTB
tasks
Olive baboons Schmitt et al., 2012
↓ shy (females) = Long-tailed
macaques




Fichtel et al., 2020
↓ Shy ↑ Shy Social PCTB
tasks
ruffed lemurs







Rearing conditions, housing conditions,
and previous contact with humans
• Impoverished rearing conditions ↓ ↓ Reversal learning
(Transfer Index)
Chimpanzees Davenport et al.,
1973













Infant chimpanzees Bard et al., 2014
• Mother-reared vs. nursery-reared ( = ) = 13of the 16
PCTB tasks
Chimpanzees Hopkins et al.,
2014
• Social housing and high levels of
human care










• Degree of previous contact with
humans (Human Orientation Index, HOI)
↑ High HOI ↑ High HOI Problem-solving Damerius et al.,
2017a
Social tolerance and organization





Petit et al., 1992
Hare et al., 2007
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Non-cognitive factors Participation/attention/
response motivation
Performance Cognitive task(s)/skill(s) Species Reference(s)
(↑) ↑ Causality scale of the PCTB Chimpanzees Herrmann et al.,
2010
(↑) ↑ Theory of Mind scale of the
PCTB
Bonobos





Joly et al., 2017
= All other PCTB tasks
• High levels of
allomaternal care







(↑) ↑ Social cognition tasks
• High degree of
fission-fusion




Amici et al., 2008
(↑) ↑ Spatial memory (similar to task
1 of the physical PCTB scale),
Support (similar to task 8 from
the physical PCTB scale)
Amici et al., 2010
c) Demographic
factors
Social rank = = Physical and social PCTB tasks Olive baboons and long-tailed
macaques
Schmitt et al., 2012
Ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs Fichtel et al., 2020
Sex (gender) (↑) males ↑ males Physical PCTB tasks of the
Space scale
Chimpanzees and orangutans Herrmann et al.,
2007
(↑) females ↑ females Physical PCTB tasks of the
Quantity Scale
Human children
= = Physical and social tasks of the
PCTB
Olive baboons and long-tailed
macaques
Schmitt et al., 2012





Joly et al., 2017
Ring-tailed lemurs, ruffed
lemurs, and mouse lemurs
Fichtel et al., 2020
↓ males = Object permanence Common marmosets Schubiger et al.,
2015
Age
• Older subjects ↑ Causality scale of the PCTB Bonobos and chimpanzees Herrmann et al.,
2010
↓ Theory of Mind scale of the
PCTB




↓ Spatial memory (physical PCTB
task); Attentional state and
gaze following (social PCTB
tasks)
(↓) ↓ Inhibitory control Common marmosets Gokcekus, 2020
(=) curious subjects = curious subjects
(Continued)
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TABLE 1 | Continued
Non-cognitive factors Participation/attention/
response motivation





• Possibility to rake-in
food reward (rather than
just push) with tool




• Food retrievable with
finger rather than tool
↑ Two-trap box Chimpanzees Seed et al., 2009
• Inedible test stimuli
(tokens)




• Food type difference
between test stimuli and
rewards
= = Brown capuchins Gazes et al., 2018
• Edible test stimuli ↑ ↑ Brown capuchins Addessi et al.,
2008; Gazes et al.,
2018
• High quality rewards ↑ ↑ Brown capuchins and squirrel
monkeys
Gazes et al., 2018
• Low probability of
success by chance (large
number of test stimuli)




(↑) ↑ Uncertainty monitoring
(computerized metacognition
task)
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin
monkeys
Beran et al., 2014
Capuchin monkeys Beran et al., 2016
• Multimodal exploration
of test stimuli
↑ ↑ Visual discrimination Capuchin monkeys Carducci et al.,
2018
Social cognition tasks
• Competitive rather than
cooperative experimenter
cues
↑ ↑ Object-choice Chimpanzees Hare and
Tomasello, 2004
• Experimenter’s cue
already in place when
subject enters test area
(↑) ↑ Barth et al., 2005
Common marmosets Burkart and Heschl,
2006
• Low probability of
random success
(↑) ↑
• Eye contact at time of
experimenter’s
communicative cue















• Excluding subjects who
need more testing time
↑ = Inhibitory control (A-not-B and
detour-reaching, adapted from






reversal learning (adapted from
the TTB)
Common marmosets
No effect: =, negative effect: ↓, positive effect: ↑. Note: Symbols in parentheses () indicate that participation/attention and response motivation were only
indirectly assessed.
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taken into account when designing tasks in which subjects
need to manipulate objects (as e.g., Schubiger et al., 2016;
Schubiger et al., 2019).
While test designers and experimenters can largely control
sensory-motor confounding factors by using appropriate test
apparatuses, they may have limited control over several other
non-cognitive factors during testing. For instance, motivational
aspects remain a potential source of bias on cognitive
performance. Examples are inner states and predispositions that
affect how individuals approach and attend to their non-social
(including cognitive tasks) and social environment (including the
human experimenter and the cognitive test situation). However,
deliberate test designs and analytical methods might alleviate
some of these issues (e.g., Schubiger et al., 2015).
Starting from primate cognition studies, we here review
recent studies that exemplary address (1) how individual
differences in several non-cognitive factors affect participation
and performance in cognitive tasks commonly used for within
and between-species comparisons and (2) how aspects of test
design and human-induced biases directly or indirectly affect
cognitive performance. Finally, we evaluate (3) how recent
studies that used cognitive test batteries may be affected
by such effects.




Individuals can differ considerably in terms of non-cognitive
factors (i.e., intrinsic ones such as individual differences in
personality, emotion and motivation) and different species differ
in social factors (such as levels of social tolerance or social
organization or structure) that might affect their cognitive
task performance. Recent comparative cognition studies have
started to assess a number of such internal (subject-related)
and external (test design-related) non-cognitive factors and their
potential effects on cognitive performance. Here, we review
several relevant studies and their findings regarding whether they




Personality. At least some personality traits have been shown
to affect cognitive performance in non-human primates. For
instance, trait anxiety as assessed by the monkeys’ sustained
reaction to a loud noise, was negatively correlated with
the cognitive performance of long-tailed macaques in a
reversal learning task (Toxopeus et al., 2005). Personality
traits of non-human primates have also been assessed in a
comparable manner to humans using the Hominoid Personality
Questionnaire (HPQ; King and Figuereo, 1997; Weiss, 2017).
Traits such as openness (behaviorally associated with the time an
individual devotes to playing with conspecifics) and assertiveness
(behaviorally associated with an individual’s aggressive behavior
toward conspecifics) were associated with the participation
and performance of capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) in
two training tasks that preceded cognitive testing. Subjects
with more open or less assertive personalities and particularly
those exhibiting a combination of both trait expressions were
more motivated to participate and also performed better in
the training tasks than less open and highly assertive subjects
(Morton et al., 2013).
Temperament and neophobia. In non-human primates,
temperament or neophobia is generally measured as the latency
to approach novel objects, humans, or food. Bolder chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes) and orang-utans (Pongo pygmaeus) approached
such novel situations more quickly and performed better in some
physical subtests of the PCTB than their shyer conspecifics. In the
social subtests, however, individual differences in temperament
were not associated with the apes’ cognitive performance in
either domain (Herrmann et al., 2007). The opposite pattern was
found for ruffed lemurs in that shyer subjects who took longer
to approach and spent less time in the testing area performed
better in the social PCTB tasks than their bolder conspecifics.
This was not the case for ring-tailed lemurs whose temperament
did not correlate with performance in the physical or social tasks
of the PCTB (Fichtel et al., 2020). Olive baboons, particularly
males, spent more time next to new objects than long-tailed
macaques and showed a shorter approach latency toward new
stimuli than long-tailed macaques, particularly females. Their
performance in the PCTB, however, was not associated with
these species and sex differences in temperament (Schmitt et al.,
2012). Importantly thus, species can interact with influences
of personality, temperament and neophobia in predicting
cognitive outcomes.
Emotional reactivity. While an individual’s temperament and
personality traits are fairly stable over time, its emotional
reactivity may differ depending on the context and be particularly
strongly expressed in the test situation. Common marmoset
(Callithrix jacchus) subjects who showed a strong spontaneous
emotional reaction to the experimenter and the test situation
participated in fewer trials of an object permanence task than
their less emotionally reactive conspecifics (Schubiger et al.,
2015). Elevated emotional arousal, which the marmosets visibly
and auditorily expressed (via piloerection of the tail as well
as increased vigilance, mobbing vocalizations and avoidance
behavior), was particularly apparent in the majority of male
individuals and affected their attention in trials in which they
participated. However, when strict pre-defined stop criteria
were applied to abort a test session when a subject’s state of
elevated emotional arousal persisted, their cognitive performance
was not affected.
Social Factors
Rearing conditions, housing conditions, and previous contact
with humans
Individual differences in rearing conditions, housing conditions
and previous contact with humans may affect cognitive
performance in primates, which is of particular importance
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when testing and comparing primates from more heterogenous
populations such as in different zoos, sanctuaries and in the
wild. One example is that a young individual who has abundant
opportunity to learn socially from its adult conspecifics (ideally
by being mother-raised), is able to acquire a larger set of
cognitive skills than an individual who is deprived of this
opportunity (such as an orphan growing up with peers; reviewed
in van Schaik and Burkart, 2011).
Adult chimpanzees, for instance, who had experienced
impoverished rearing conditions in the first two years of their lives,
performed poorly in a reversal learning task (as reflected in their
lower transfer indices, a measure of cognitive flexibility) than
their mother-raised conspecifics (Davenport et al., 1973), even
though all chimpanzees had been living at the same facility during
the last six years prior to cognitive testing.
Enriched rearing conditions, on the other hand, favored
whether chimpanzees (Gallup et al., 1971) and gorillas (Patterson
and Cohn, 1994; Posada and Colell, 2007) showed evidence of
mirror self-recognition. Moreover, infant chimpanzees growing
up in enriched nursery-care conditions developed better socio-
cognitive abilities than their conspecifics raised in standard
nursery care, particularly those abilities related to joint attention
(as measured by 30 tasks of the Bayley Scales of Infant
Development for human infants: BSID, Bayley, 1969) and
cooperation (as rated by the experimenter using the Infant
Behavior Record: IBR, Bayley, 1969; Bard et al., 2014). A more
recent study with zoo-housed chimpanzees, however, found
that being mother-reared vs. nursery-reared was not associated
with how well adult chimpanzees performed in the subset
of 13 physical and social PCTB tasks they were tested with
(Hopkins et al., 2014).
Being housed with conspecifics in zoos and sanctuaries and
being cared for by humans allows individuals to be more
curious and explorative toward their surroundings than their
single-housed conspecifics. Such favorable rearing and housing
conditions, most likely in combination with higher exposure to
human artifacts, facilitated performance in the Orangutan Test
Battery (OTB, Damerius et al., 2017b).
Individual differences in orangutans’ previous contact with
humans have recently been quantified by a new composite
measure that assesses individual differences in the subjects’
behavioral response to unfamiliar humans, the Human
Orientation Index (HOI, Damerius et al., 2017a). Individuals
who had been more exposed to humans exhibited higher
HOI-scores than those with limited human exposure, were more
explorative and also more successful than less human-oriented
orangutans at solving the honey-box task of the OTB, in which
they had to use tools to extract honey from a wooden apparatus
(also see Damerius et al., 2019).
Social organization and social tolerance
Primate species differ regarding their social organization such as
the spatiotemporal cohesion of the societies they live in (Kappeler
and van Schaik, 2002). Fission-fusion societies, for instance, are
characterized by dynamic group compositions with changing
associations between individuals both in time and in strength
(Dunbar, 1988). In haplorrhine primates more generally, ape
and monkey species living in social systems characterized by a
high degree of fission-fusion dynamics, such as great apes and
spider monkeys, performed better in two physical cognition
tasks similar to the ones of the PCTB (“spatial memory” and
“shape”) and in several inhibitory control tasks from other
sources (Amici et al., 2008, 2010).
Primate species also differ considerably in terms of social
tolerance levels. Tolerant primate societies are characterized
by less steep dominance hierarchies, low levels of conflicts
without clear directionality, and feeding in close proximity
(Jaeggi et al., 2010a; Fichtel et al., 2018). All these factors can
facilitate highly social behavior such as cooperating in solving
problems and prosocial acts such as proactively sharing food with
conspecifics (Jaeggi and van Schaik, 2011; Burkart et al., 2014).
For instance, in cooperative tasks (that required two individuals
to simultaneously lift heavy stones to uncover food items or
pull-in a feeding platform they would both be able to access)
more tolerant macaque and ape species performed better than
less tolerant ones. In particular, Tonkean macaques performed
better than rhesus macaques (Petit et al., 1992) and bonobos
better than chimpanzees (Hare et al., 2007). Likewise, socially
more tolerant macaque species performed better than less socially
tolerant macaque species in an inhibitory control task and in one
PCTB task from the social scale (pointing cups) that tests the
subject’s ability to communicate to the experimenter in which
location food has earlier been placed by a second person, but
not in any other PCTB tasks (Joly et al., 2017). Finally, the
cooperative callitrichid monkeys (marmosets and tamarins with
higher levels of allomaternal care) exhibit generally high levels of
social tolerance, which appears to facilitate performance in socio-
cognitive tasks such as social learning or cooperative problem
solving compared to their less tolerant sister taxa (Burkart and
van Schaik, 2010, 2016). Importantly, at least in primates, social
tolerance can also differ considerably between different groups of
the same species (Jaeggi et al., 2010b; Cronin et al., 2014; Burkart,
2015) and thus mask or exaggerate potential species differences
in cognitive performance.
Demographic Factors
The potential effects of individual differences in demographic
factors on cognitive performance are well known and often taken
into account by comparing balanced, unbiased samples to avoid
confounding effects or statistically controlled in studies using
cognitive test batteries.
Social rank
An individual’s rank in its social group is typically inferred via
the number of decided conflicts between individuals gathered via
focal observations. An individual’s social rank did not affect its
cognitive performance in any of the PTCB tasks in olive baboons,
long-tailed macaques (Schmitt et al., 2012) or ring-tailed and
ruffed lemurs (Fichtel et al., 2020).
Sex
Male chimpanzees in Herrmann et al.’s (2007) PCTB study
performed better than females in the space scale and male
children performed better than female children in the quantities
scale. However, in Hopkins et al.’s (2014) chimpanzee study, a
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subject’s sex did not affect its performance in the PCTB and
neither did it in baboons and long-tailed macaques, although
male and female individuals differed in terms of temperament
in these two Old World primate species (Schmitt et al., 2012).
Similarly, sex did not influence the performance of three lemur
species in the PCTB (Fichtel et al., 2020). In marmosets, males
were generally more easily emotionally aroused in the test
situation than females and less food motivated to participate
in the cognitive tasks (Schubiger et al., 2015). In addition,
males were often more attentive to their surroundings than the
test apparatus in front of them, which is in line with males
showing more vigilance behavior in the wild (Koenig, 1998).
Importantly, however, because they were given the opportunity
to leave the test situation as soon as they became unmotivated and
inattentive, and because inattentive trials were excluded from the
analysis, they performed comparably to their female conspecifics
(Schubiger et al., 2015).
Age
Generally, as in humans, cognitive abilities recruiting fast and
flexible (fluid) mental processes and maintaining information
such as executive functions (e.g., inhibitory control) are also
predicted to decrease with increasing age in non-human primates
(e.g., Deary et al., 2009). Cognitive abilities that improve with
experience, on the other hand, such as many social ones,
are predicted to increase over an individual’s lifetime (for a
review see Burkart et al., 2017a). Interestingly, the opposite
pattern was found in chimpanzees (Lacreuse et al., 2014) in
that age had a positive effect on individual performance in
the physical cognition tasks of the PCTB (with the exception
of the spatial memory task) but a negative effect on their
performance in two of the socio-cognitive tasks (attentional
state, gaze following). Similarly, older chimpanzees and bonobos
performed better in some of the physical tasks (causality
scale) but not as well as younger individuals in some social
tasks (Theory of Mind scale, Herrmann et al., 2010). In
the other studies applying the PCTB, no such age-effects on
cognitive performance were reported (Schmitt and Fischer,
2011; Fichtel et al., 2020). Another interesting finding was
that high levels of curiosity appeared to alleviate cognitive
decline in marmosets (Gokcekus, 2020). While marmosets’
ability to inhibit directly reaching into a transparent barrier
(detour-reaching tasks) declined with age in individuals with
low curiosity scores, this ability remained stable in particularly
curious individuals and in some cases even increased with age.
Hence, the influence of age on performance in cognitive tests is
not straightforward.
External (Test Design-Related) Effects on
Performance
Task Format
Task format, i.e., the way in which a cognitive task is designed
and how (many) test stimuli are presented to the subject, not
only generally affected cognitive performance in several empirical
comparative cognition studies but it sometimes did so in different
ways in different species.
Physical cognition tasks
One physical task that has been used to test the causal
understanding of non-human primates is the trap-tube task,
originally designed by Visalberghi and Limongelli (1994) testing
capuchin monkeys. In the original trap-tube task, a food reward
was placed in a transparent tube that contained a trap in its
middle. In order to retrieve the reward, the subject had to use
a stick tool and push the reward out of the tube while preventing
it from falling into the trap. To ensure that chimpanzees were not
using simple distance rules rather than causal reasoning, the trap
was later moved to the side and the reward placed in the tube’s
middle instead (Limongelli et al., 1995), but this could not rule
out other simple rules such as always pushing the food away from
the trap, which chimpanzees tended to do even when the trap
was inverted and non-functional (Povinelli, 2000). The strongest
evidence for great apes’ causal understanding of the trap-tube
problem comes from studies using modified task versions. For
instance, great apes performed better in a modified trap-tube
task, in which the tube was wider so that the apes could also
use the stick tool to rake-in the reward (thereby pulling it away
from the trap) rather than having to push the reward away from
the trap (Mulcahy and Call, 2006). This suggests that improving
the ecological validity of the task, which allowed the apes to
use the tool in a more natural way, helped reveal their causal
understanding. In a further modified version, the Two Trap Box
task, the reward was placed on a shelf that had a trap on each
end (one of which was blocked depending on the trial). Through
the transparent front of the box, the subject had visual access to
the test apparatus and could use its finger to move the reward
away from the trap without requiring a tool, which made the
task easier for chimpanzees (Seed et al., 2009). A similar task
version consisting of a box with six channels each containing
a trap was used in the OTB (Damerius et al., 2019), and a
considerable number of individuals succeeded, suggesting that
the causal problem was easier to solve when they could use their
fingers instead of a tool.
In a quantity discrimination task (requiring subjects to choose
the larger of two amounts of items), two Old World monkey
species, olive baboons (Papio anubis) and long-tailed macaques
(Macaca fascicularis) performed better when the test stimuli were
inedible (i.e., tokens) as opposed to edible items (i.e., raisins).
Interestingly, the same monkeys performed equally well with
edible test stimuli when the food type of the edible items they
were rewarded with differed from the food type of the test stimuli
(Schmitt and Fischer, 2011). Contrarily, capuchins monkeys
(Cebus sapajus apella) performed better with edible stimuli than
tokens (Addessi et al., 2008; independent of food types: Gazes
et al., 2018) and generally better than squirrel monkeys (Saimiri
sciureus). When the quality of food rewards was modulated,
both New World monkey species performed better with higher
quality rewards independent of how long they had to wait to
be rewarded (Gazes et al., 2018). This heterogeneous influence
most likely emerged because highly attractive rewards on the
one hand increase an individual’s motivation, but on the other
hand elicit prepotent reactions and thus can increase demands on
inhibitory control. Depending on which influence prevails, high
quality rewards can both increase and decrease task performance.
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Task format can also include how stimuli are presented,
e.g., only visually or visually and haptically. This turned out
to influence performance in a visual discrimination task, in
capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.). They were more successful
at distinguishing between two objects when they had access to
haptic in addition to purely visual information by being allowed
to touch and manipulate the objects suggesting they benefited
from this multimodal exploration (Carducci et al., 2018).
Finally, task formats can vary with regard to chance
probabilities of success. Modifications of these probabilities in
physical cognition tasks revealed that common marmosets and
common squirrel monkeys performed better in a memory task
in which they had a choice between nine containers, only one
of which was baited with a food item, than in the original two-
choice version of the task. Lowering the chance probability of
success from 50 to 11% made wrong choices in the nine-choice
memory taskmore costly and is likely to have indirectly enhanced
the monkeys’ motivation to favor an appropriate rather than a
random choice strategy and thus more reliably assessed their
memory decline over increasingly longer time delays (Schubiger
et al., 2016). Similarly, capuchin monkeys showed better evidence
of uncertainty monitoring in a computerized metacognition task
by more often selecting the escape option when chance levels of
success were lower than when they were higher, whereas rhesus
macaques appeared less sensitive to higher costs of incorrect
choices (Beran et al., 2014, 2016).
Social cognition tasks
One of the most extensively used social cognition test paradigms
in comparative psychology is the object choice task (originally
developed by Anderson et al., 1995) in which the experimenter
sits or stands opposite the subject, hides a food item in one of
at least two containers, and then provides the subject with at
least one (visual and/or auditory) communicative cue to indicate
the food’s location before the subject is allowed to choose one
of the containers. Primates, especially great apes, have been
shown to perform poorly in comparison to many other animal
species, including distantly related mammals such as canids
as well as birds (e.g., Bräuer et al., 2006; Giret et al., 2009).
However, although this has been interpreted as the apes’ inability
to understand human-given communicative cues, the original
test setup used for primates differed from the one used for other
animal species and several modifications to the primate version
substantially improved the apes’ performance (for a detailed
review see Mulcahy and Hedge, 2012), the most relevant of
which we list here.
Competitive experimenter cues. In one object-choice study,
chimpanzees performed better in an object-choice task if the
experimenter’s cue was competitive in that he extended his arm
in an attempt to grab the baited container rather than pointing at
it in a cooperative manner (Hare and Tomasello, 2004). However,
as Mulcahy and Hedge (2012) pointed out, the competitive task
version also differed from the cooperative one in that the former
included a potential inhibition component and higher costs of
an incorrect choice. Before being able to choose one of the two
containers, the apes had to open a corresponding transparent
panel in the testing window. Having to do so might not only
have prevented them from making ambiguous choices but also
enhanced their motivation to attend to the experimenter’s cue(s).
This in turn might have helped them to perform better in the
competitive task version.
Experimenter’s cue already in place when subject enters the test
area. In Barth et al.’s (2005) object choice study, chimpanzees
performed poorly in the original version of the task in which
the experimenter provided the communicative cue (head and
eyes directed toward the baited container) only once the subject
was directly in front of the experimenter. In contrast, the same
chimpanzees located the reward much more successfully in a
modified task version, in which the experimenter initialized the
gaze cue before the subject entered the test area. This indicates
that when entering the test area, the chimpanzees immediately
looked into the direction of the experimenter’s cue and as they
were approaching, they veered in this direction which would
result in them arriving at and choosing the correct container.
Similarly, in a marmoset study, the subjects’ access to choosing
containers was restricted until the experimenter had provided the
pointing gesture toward the baited container which might have
facilitated basic inhibitory and attentional processes required to
make correct choices (Burkart and Heschl, 2006).
Lowering the chance probability of random success. Burkart
and Heschl’s (2006) task version also differed from other
object-choice studies in that marmosets were presented with
nine containers, only one of which contained a reward. This
version was directly compared to a two container version,
and the marmosets performed much better in the first one,
which probably enhanced their motivation to attend to the
experimenter’s cues because incorrect choices involved a higher
cost than in the traditional object choice task with two
choice options. Together with similar findings on chance
probabilities from two physical cognition tasks (i.e., memory
andmetacognition)mentioned earlier, this suggests that lowering
the chance probability of making correct choices at random by
increasing the number of available choice options may positively
affect performance in tasks across cognitive domains.
Increasing the distance between test stimuli. Other modifications
to the original object choice task, such as increasing the distance
between the containers in which the food item is hidden,
have also been shown to positively affect the performance of
bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans in object choice tasks
(e.g., Mulcahy and Call, 2009). The distance between test stimuli
also turned out to be responsible for discrepant results in
perspective-taking tasks that assess whether the subject knows if
a conspecific individual present in the test situation can see a
reward (i.e., because it is visible from both the subject’s and the
conspecific’s point of view) or not (i.e., because a barrier obstructs
the conspecific’s view). Initial findings by Hare et al. (2000)
suggesting that chimpanzees knew what their conspecific could
see could not be readily replicated (Karin-D’Arcy and Povinelli,
2002), but it turned out that this was owing to variation in spatial
factors of the set-up. In the meantime, this paradigm has been
applied to a variety of species with varying results, and it is not
entirely clear which differences represent true species differences
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and which ones may be affected by spatial factors too (e.g.,
capuchin monkeys: Hare et al., 2003 vs. common marmosets:
Burkart and Heschl, 2007).
Establishing eye contact when giving the cue. Although it is
effortful to establish eye contact with some non-human primate
subjects and this is not possible with all species (e.g., owing to gaze
aversion or being perceived as a threatening gesture), ensuring
in this way that the subject is attentive to the experimenter’s
cues has been shown to improve the performance of bonobos,
chimpanzees, and orangutans in the object choice task (Mulcahy
and Call, 2009; Mulcahy and Suddendorf, 2011).
Opportunistic Testing
Excluding Subjects With Motivational Issues
One specific issue of comparative psychology is that not all
species and not all individuals within a given species are equally
motivated to continually participate in cognitive tasks. An
individual’s lack of motivation to do so can critically affect the
course of a study because the individual will require substantially
more than the allocated or available testing time to complete
the cognitive tasks. This can be particularly problematic in
cognitive studies with non-human primates because access to
respective testing facilities is often temporally limited, which
constrains the time available for a study. Researchers often deal
with this constraint by following an opportunistic approach of
only testing individuals who readily participate and are most
likely to complete the tasks in the available testing time and
excluding those who are not. However, such opportunistic testing
might bias a study’s outcome if the excluded individuals not only
differ from the selected ones in motivational factors but also in
terms of cognitive abilities.
In a recent study with common marmosets and common
squirrel monkeys, this issue has been addressed by including less
consistently motivated individuals and allowing them additional
time to complete the six tasks of a cognitive test battery at
their own pace (Schubiger et al., 2019). A direct comparison
of individuals who needed additional testing time to those who
were consistently motivated showed that both groups performed
equally well in all tasks. This suggests that opportunistic testing
and the selection bias that results from it does not necessarily
affect a study’s outcome.Whether this also applies to other species
still needs to be established.
HOW ARE INDIVIDUAL AND SPECIES
COMPARISONS USING COGNITIVE TEST
BATTERIES AFFECTED BY
NON-COGNITIVE FACTORS?
When using test batteries to assess individual differences within
a species, priority is given to the same individuals completing
all tasks. This is because obtaining a complete data set enables
researchers to conduct factor-analytical performance analysis
whereas dropouts would complicate this approach. A second
goal is to obtain large enough sample sizes to reach sufficient
statistical power. As current data suggest, using an opportunistic
(as opposed to a randomized) approach by only selecting those
individuals as subjects who are most likely to stay consistently
motivated and complete all tasks is not a major issue. At least
not as long as researchers report that and why this approach was
followed and as long as dropouts and their performance in the
few tasks they completed are also reported in detail.
However, some individuals (or species) might also require
more time to get used to a new task because they are neophobic
and more cautious when approaching the test apparatus for
the first time. It is therefore advisable to allow every subject
to familiarize itself with the basic test apparatus and to only
start testing when the subject appears comfortable with all
components. Highly neophilic individuals, on the other hand,
tend to approach and get used to the test apparatus much more
quickly with the risk that some of these individuals might also
more quickly lose interest once the task is not novel anymore.
In order to enable later replications of a study, it is therefore
important to describe in detail how subjects were familiarized
with the tasks prior to testing, how their motivation was regained
if necessary, and which criteria were used to objectively decide
when a test session started and when it had to be aborted.
Besides opportunistic testing, using several experimenters
rather than just one is another way to test as many subjects
as possible with all tasks in a limited testing period. Although
training different experimenters to use the same standardized
methods helps reducing experimenter effects that might bias the
subjects’ cognitive performance, a certain risk of such unintended
biases remains. Herrmann et al. (2007), for instance, used five
different experimenters in the original PCTB study, including two
experimenters with the rule that every subject was tested by the
same experimenter with all tasks. Since one group of chimpanzees
performed better than the other, Herrmann and her colleagues
could not tease apart in how far these differences were purely
cognitive in nature or also experimenter-induced.
Another issue is that not all subjects are equally motivated to
participate in food-reward tasks and different food types do not
have the same value for all individuals. One way of limiting such
individual differences is to use tokens as test stimuli rather than
food items (e.g., Addessi et al., 2008; Schmitt and Fischer, 2011).
However, subjects need to be trained to use tokens, which limits
the usefulness of this approach, particularly for large-scale species
comparisons because test battery tasks should not require any
previous experience. Quantity discrimination tasks in which the
subject has to choose the larger of two quantities (of food or token
items) to pass a trial have shown to be particularly susceptible
to the type of test stimuli and rewards (Schmitt and Fischer,
2011; Gazes et al., 2018). Regardless of whether subjects chooses
between two amounts of tokens or food items, the number of
rewards usually corresponds to the chosen amount of test stimuli.
However, this procedure differs from the one used in all other
test battery tasks in which the subject usually only receives one
reward in case of a correct choice, which could be one possible
explanation why the task appeared to be difficult for squirrel
monkeys in Gazes et al.’s (2018) study. Therefore, in the quantity
discrimination task of their adapted test battery, Schubiger et al.
(2019) used two amounts of edible “tokens” of low food quality
as test stimuli, which made them interesting enough to attend
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to the task (and more interesting than non-food tokens) but
not desirable as rewards. If the subject correctly chose the larger
amount, it was, as in all other tasks, rewarded with one highly
desirable food item. They found that the dropout rate in the
quantity discrimination task was particularly low in comparison
to most other tasks and the marmosets performed better in this
task than in most others. Whether this was a consequence of
the setup and reward contingency remains to be determined
in future studies.
The most comprehensive test battery currently available for
non-human primates is the PCTB consisting of a physical
and social cognition scale that each comprise several subtests
amounting to a total of 16 cognitive tasks (Herrmann et al., 2007).
Initially, the PCTB was applied to the largest sample of great
apes (chimpanzees and orangutans) that had ever been tested
in comparative psychology and to 2.5 years-old human children
who outperformed both ape species in most social but not in the
physical cognition tasks. In the last decade, the full PCTB or parts
of it (ranging from six to 13 tasks) have been used to assess and
compare the cognitive abilities of ten other non-human primate
species (with some minor adaptations). Besides an independent
chimpanzee sample (tested with 13 tasks: Hopkins et al., 2014) the
tested species included bonobos (Pan paniscus, Herrmann et al.,
2010) one small ape species (lar gibbons, Hylobathes lar, Yocom,
2010, tested with six tasks), five Old World monkey species
(olive baboons, Papio anubis, Schmitt et al., 2012; longtailed-
macaques, Macaca fascicularis, Schmitt et al., 2012; Joly et al.,
2017; Barbary macaques, Macaca sylvanus, rhesus macaques,
Macaca mulatta, and Tonkean macaques,Macaca tonkeana, Joly
et al., 2017) and three lemur species (tested with all tasks;
black-and-white ruffed lemurs, Varecia variegata, ring-tailed
lemurs, Lemur catta, and mouse lemurs, Microcebus murinus,
Fichtel et al., 2020). In addition, four bird species (parrots)
have recently also been tested with the full PCTB (African
grey parrots, Psittacus erithacus, blue-headed macaws, Primolius
couloni, blue-throated macaws, Ara glaucogularis, and great
green macaws, Ara ambiguous, Krasheninnikova et al., 2019).
Unanticipatedly and in contrast to previous meta-analytic studies
(Deaner et al., 2006; Reader et al., 2011), the primate studies
found that overall Old World monkeys and lemurs (who as
strepsirrhines represent the evolutionarily most distant primate
relatives of great apes) performed largely comparable to great
apes, particularly in the social scale. Contrarily, all four parrot
species performed inferior to great apes in both the physical and
social scale of the PCTB (Krasheninnikova et al., 2019). This was
unanticipated because parrots (besides corvids and owls) belong
to the birds with the largest brain size and parts of their brains
have been described as homologous to the mammalian neocortex
(Jarvis et al., 2005; Güntürkün and Bugnyar, 2016). Based on
their powerful brains and their remarkable cognitive abilities
that have been demonstrated in several tasks and sometimes
been considered to match or even exceed those of non-human
primates (e.g., Pepperberg, 2006), the parrots were expected to
perform relatively well in the PCTB.
Three explanations appear most plausible for this arguably
unexpected pattern of results: (i) the tested species do not
differ in terms of cognitive abilities (which would be in line
with Macphail’s null hypothesis), (ii) small differences in task
designs rather than cognitive ability masked species differences
in cognitive performance, or (iii) the levels of task sensitivity
were not appropriate to identify between-species variation and
instead led to ceiling (i.e., mainly very high performance scores)
or floor effects (i.e., mainly very low performance scores). While
the first possibility appears unlikely to explain the primate and
parrot findings based on what is known about their cognitive
abilities, the two other two possibilities or a combination of the
two (depending on the tasks and species) appear more plausible.
The lack of clear-cut performance differences between the
different primate taxa points to ceiling effects in most tasks of the
PCTB with relatively good performance levels in all species most
likely owing to the relatively low task sensitivity (Fichtel et al.,
2020). Moreover, all PCTB studies with monkeys and lemurs also
found floor effects for at least one physical (tool use) and one
social cognition task (social learning). In fact, only great apes
passed the tool use task that required the ability to use a stick
tool to rake a food reward into reach whereas no other primate
species did. Doing so might have been too challenging for species
exhibiting either a medium (baboons, macaques) or low (lemurs)
level of precision grip (Torigoe, 1985; Kittler et al., 2018). This is
not surprising because, even in captivity, great apes use stick tools
more often and more skillfully than other primate species.
Comparably to the primates, all tested macaw species also
performed relatively poorly in the tool-use task despite other
parrot species (such as Goffin’s cockatoos, Cacatua goffiniana)
having been shown to be skillful at using a stick to retrieve food
in previous experiments. According to Krasheninnikova et al.
(2019), this indicates that morphological rather than cognitive
constraints such as their longer maxilla and a less muscular
tongue made it difficult for the macaws to maneuver the stick and
pull the food reward into reach.
The social learning task of the PCTB, for which another floor
effect was found, required subjects to solve a problem using the
same solution that a human experimenter had demonstrated,
i.e., retrieving a food item out of a transparent or opaque tube
using the same behavioral actions. It is not surprising that human
children performed better than great apes in this task because
children have been shown to over-imitate actions of adults by
even copying unnecessary or unsuccessful steps or methods of a
human demonstrator whereas chimpanzees did not (Horner and
Whiten, 2005). In addition, however, children could learn from a
conspecific demonstrator whereas all other species had to learn
from a hetero-specific demonstrator, the human experimenter.
Among non-human primates, great apes possess the most similar
preconditions to children in that their hands and manipulation
skills resemble those of humans the most (Heldstab et al., 2016).
Consequently, a social learning task in which subjects could
learn from a conspecific demonstrator and that is adapted to the
manipulative skills of monkeys and lemurs might have beenmore
informative (Fichtel et al., 2020).
A striking result was, however, that the parrots performed
at chance-levels in most of the tasks of the PCTB, indicating
that non-cognitive factors as well as aspects of task design may
have played a role. Particularly in the space scale that largely
consisted of object permanence tasks, all primates outperformed
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the macaws despite parrots having been shown to pass such
invisible displacement tasks in previous studies, and even before
reaching adulthood. As Krasheninnikova et al. (2019) suggested,
having to choose containers by touching them with their beaks
might have made it more demanding for the parrots to inhibit
prepotent impulses to touch containers. Based on earlier findings
on parrots’ numerical cognitive abilities, the African grey parrots
and macaws would also have been expected to perform much
better in the quantity tasks. The authors’ finding that many
individuals seemed to choose in a randommanner inmany PCTB
tasks, particularly in those that involved only two choice options,
is in line with earlier findings on primates that subjects may not
always be motivated to attend to the task and use an appropriate
choice strategy when they have a 50% probability of making a
correct choice by chance and being rewarded (e.g., Burkart and
Heschl, 2007; Schubiger et al., 2016, 2019; Fichtel et al., 2020).
It is important to mention that while great apes only received
one to three trials per task of the PCTB, other primates (Old
World monkeys and lemurs) and parrots received up to six trials
per subtest. In the object-permanence tasks of the physical scale,
for instance, the monkeys and lemurs received six trials so that all
spatial positions and combinations of the baited cups were evenly
distributed. In principal, participating in the double amount of
trials might have given them an advantage over the great apes
in that they had the opportunity to learn and perform better
across trials. However, the monkey and lemur results were stable
and there were no learning effects from the first to the second
half of trials, which makes it unlikely that they had a substantial
learning advantage over the great apes (Schmitt and Fischer,
2011; Fichtel et al., 2020).
Therefore, the most plausible explanation for the apparent
lack of cognitive differences between various primate species
based on individual performance scores in the PCTB, is that some
of the tasks are not valid or sensitive enough to reveal differences
between species (Fichtel et al., 2020). For instance, all primate
species from lemurs to great apes performed very well in the
spatial memory task of the PCTB’s space subscale, which was
basically an object permanence task formost species as it involved
keeping track of two food items placed in two of three cups
without a delay between the baiting of the cup and the subject’s
choice. Only the transposition task, in which keeping track of
the food item became more demanding, revealed some species
differences, which indicates that this task’s level of difficulty was
appropriate to distinguish between species while the other tasks
of the space subscale led to ceiling effects.
The floor effects in the primates’ and parrots’ performance
demonstrate that researchers are facing a trade-off when
constructing cognitive test batteries. While the test set-ups need
to be sufficiently abstract to also identify a putative domain-
general cognitive ability rather than only capturing narrow
domain-specific adaptations, the task apparatuses also need
to be ecologically valid enough to be easily perceived and
handled by all individuals. While closely related species can
be largely tested with the same test apparatuses and setups
with only minor adjustments, large-scale species comparisons
might require more changes. This might particularly be the
case for species with low dexterity levels or those who have
to use their beaks (birds) or noses (e.g., canids and elephants)
to handle the test apparatus and make responses. As the
parrot results suggest, validated tasks should be used that can
be adjusted for as many species as possible while keeping
the cognitive task itself as similar as possible. This is an
immense challenge for comparative psychology that yet needs to
be accomplished.
One task that may be promising for meaningful species
comparisons is the reversal learning task (Rumbaugh, 1971) in
which all individuals (of every species) first have to master an
initial discrimination by reaching the same predefined criterion.
In the actual test, the discrimination is then reversed and
it is assessed how quickly the subjects switch to the new
discrimination in relation to their pre-reversal performance
(Transfer Index). Despite their timeliness, reversal learning tasks
have rarely been part of cognitive test batteries. Moreover, the
pivotal measure, the Transfer index, has only been determined
in one study that used a modified version of the TTB task to
test marmosets (Schubiger et al., 2019). The latter task version
was optimized in that two differently patterned black-and-white
plates were used as test stimuli under which the reward could
be hidden, rather than presenting and hiding the reward in the
experimenter’s hands (two different colors of gloves, including a
green one) as in the original TTB. This optimization was applied
in order to minimize potential effects of individual differences in
the subjects’ color-vision as well as potential experimenter effects.
Including reversal learning tasks in future test batteries will allow
to compare the cognitive flexibility of different individuals and
species regardless of how long they needed to reach the initial
criterion. Doing so would also help to establish whether new
experimental data support findings from metanalytical research
in which reversal learning performance was the best predictor of
general intelligence across species (Deaner et al., 2006).
Most importantly, however, our findings illustrate the
importance of conducting basic validations of cognitive tasks
and test batteries in comparative psychology before applying
them to a broader range of different species. This can be
achieved by establishing that the cognitive tasks truly measure
differences and similarities in aspects of cognition rather than
other aspects that are not primarily cognitive in nature. One
possible way of doing so is to first establish that each cognitive
task (of a future test battery) identifies intra- and inter-
individual cognitive variation in one species by assessing which
potentially confounding factors can be ruled out or have to
be controlled as far as possible. In a second step this species
could then be compared to its closest evolutionary relatives
and then to more distant ones. Another way is to use one
or a small number of established and validated cognitive tasks
to compare the cognitive abilities of a wide range of different
species (e.g., as in the Many Primates project, ManyPrimates
et al., 2019a,b). Importantly, in the latter type of studies,
relatively overt differences in sensory-motor aptitudes need
to be considered, particularly when comparing evolutionarily
distantly related taxa (e.g., such as primate to bird species).
While minor adaptations to the basic test setup and apparatus
might be sufficient in some tasks, other tasks might require
more substantial modifications to be suitable for a wide range
of species. This is a challenge, which might demand (repeated)
re-designing of tasks that turn out to be unsuitable but a challenge
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worth pursuing in order to establish that cognitive tests truly
capture cognitive differences and similarities between individuals
and species. Optimized test batteries consisting of tasks that are
largely controlled for these factors will more accurately measure
if and how species compare or differ in terms of cognitive
abilities without non-cognitive factors playing a substantial role.
This will provide a more solid base for meaningful inferences
and conclusions regarding how these similarities or differences
may have evolved.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we provided an overview of recent studies
that assessed (subject- and test design-related) non-cognitive
factors that may confound the outcomes of primate cognition
tasks in general and primate test batteries in particular. In
order to take into account sensory-motor species-differences,
we have largely focused on studies with primates rather than
other mammals or birds (with the exception of the PCTB
that was applied to several parrot species). Our findings from
these typical comparative cognition tasks suggest that individual
differences in non-cognitive internal (subject-related) factors
(such as personality-mediated intrinsic motivational factors)
affected cognitive performance primarily via attention, which
in principle can be controlled or at least quantified. Depending
on the individuals and species tested, differences in social
and demographic factors may positively or negatively affect
performance. Unless cognitive comparisons specifically account
for the influence of such factors on cognitive performance, it is
therefore essential to report these potential sources of variation
and control them if possible.
We conclude that non-cognitive factors are a minor issue if
experimenters ensure they only test attentive individuals who
are motivated to use appropriate response strategies. This is best
achieved by either presenting more than two choice options to
the subjects whenever possible or by using modified two-choice
task versions that prevent motivational issues. Since relatively
small differences in task format and test procedures can have
major effects on the outcomes of comparative cognition studies,
it is essential to report the testing procedure and individual
results in detail, ideally supplemented with video clips. While
basic aspects of internal task validity can thus be improved by
establishing that the tasks measure at least cognition per se,
the more specific issue of construct validity remains. Since all
cognitive abilities represent constructs and as such have to be
inferred from cognitive test performance, each construct needs
to be carefully defined before its validity can be established.
Although establishing construct validity in a top-down (theory-
based) rather than a bottom-up approach (statistically) would be
ideal, doing so is extremely challenging (but see Burkart et al.,
2017a,b for recommendations on how to achieve this).
In sum, test design remains the major issue of contemporary
comparative psychology and it is essential that researchers
validate and redesign cognitive tests, if needed, in order to
ascertain that the tasks accurately capture cognitive abilities.
Once the sensitivity, reliability, and internal validity of cognitive
tasks have been established, these tasks can then be integrated
into test batteries and applied to an increasingly wide range
of species. This will also help establishing their external
validity, i.e., if they measure the same cognitive abilities in
different species. Such evaluated test batteries that only include
tasks with established internal and external validity will then
hopefully provide a solid base for future cognitive comparisons
and further our understanding of the evolution of mind,
including the human mind.
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